Rank Reduction in Bimatrix Games by Heyman, Joseph L. & Gupta, Abhishek
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
00
45
7v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  3
1 M
ar 
20
19
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Rank Reduction in Bimatrix Games
Joseph L. Heyman · Abhishek Gupta
Received: April 3, 2019/ Accepted: date
Abstract The rank of a bimatrix game is defined as the rank of the sum of the
payoff matrices of the two players. Under certain conditions on the payoff matrices,
we devise a method that reduces the rank of the game without changing the
equilibrium of the game. We leverage matrix pencil theory and Wedderburn rank
reduction formula to arrive at our results. We also present a constructive proof of
the fact that in a generic square game, the rank of the game can be reduced by 1,
and in generic rectangular game, the rank of the game can be reduced by 2 under
certain assumptions.
Keywords Bimatrix Games · Wedderburn Rank Reduction · Matrix Pencils ·
Strategic Equivalence in Games
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1 Introduction
The study of game theory — the model of strategic interaction between rational
agents — has a rich history dating back to the formalization of the field by John
von Neumann in 1928 [26]. The concept of equivalence, in particular strategic equiv-
alence, between game theoretic models also enjoys a rich history, dating back to at
least von Neumann and Morgenstern’s book first published in 1944 [27, p. 245]. We
say that two games, G and G′, are strategically equivalent if the optimal strategies
of every player in G corresponds to the optimal strategies of every player in G′.1
Computing a solution in a k-player finite normal-form game G, typically re-
ferred to as a Nash equilibrium (NE), is one of the fundamental problems in game
theory.2 Due to the well known theorem by Nash in 1951, we know that every finite
game has a solution, possibly in mixed strategies [21]. However, outside of some
restricted classes of games, it is not clear that a NE can be efficiently computed.
In this work we focus on finite, 2-player bimatrix games in which the payoffs
to the players can be represented as two matrices, A and B, and define the rank
of a game as the rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices.The rank of a game is
known to impact both the most suitable computation methods for determining a
solution and the expressive power of the game. For example, it is well known that
zero-sum games3, which are rank-0 games, can be solved via a linear programming
approach. For approximate solutions, [17] give a computational method for rank-k
games, defined as a class of games where rank(A+B) ≤ k, for some given k.
On the other hand, many operations that preserve the strategic equivalence
of bimatrix games modify the rank of the game. For example, the well studied
constant-sum game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game.4 However, the
zero-sum game has rank zero, while the constant-sum game is a rank-1 game. Since
the rank of a game influences both the most suitable solution techniques and the
expressive nature of a game, one should be particularly interested in determining
if a given game G′ is strategically equivalent to a game G, where the rank of G is
less than the rank of G′.
In this contribution, we do just that. Given a game G′, we apply the classical
theory of matrix pencils in conjunction with the Wedderburn rank reduction for-
mula to determine whether or not G′ is strategically equivalent to a game of lower
rank. If so, we also show techniques for efficiently calculating the lower rank game.
Prior to discussing related research in this area, let us first proceed to outline
the remainder of the paper. In the next section, we review some game theoretic
concepts, introduce our notation, and proceed to define the specific form of strate-
gic equivalence that we consider. Following that, we then formalize our problem
and present the main result. Then, in Section 4, we briefly review the theory of
matrix pencils and the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, and apply those re-
sults to derive a sequence of theorems and corollaries which thus prove the main
result. Following that, we present some consequences of our results when applied to
1 See Subsection 2.1 for a more formal definition and the specific form of strategic equivalence
that we study in this work.
2 Nash equilibrium is an acceptable and a widely used solution concept for games, and we
define it later in the paper.
3 A game is called a zero sum game if the sum of payoffs of the players is identically zero
for all actions of the players.
4 In a constant-sum game, the sum of the two payoff matrices equals a constant matrix.
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generic (random) games. We then proceed to compare our results to other results
in the literature, discuss some additional immediate consequences of our results,
and lightly touch on some algorithmic implications. Finally we wrap up the paper
with a conclusion, and collect some related theorems and proofs in the appendix.
1.1 Prior Work
Many papers in the literature have explored the concept of equivalent classes of
games. One such concept, which we focus on in this work, is strategic equivalence,
those games that share exactly the same set of NE. Indeed, for a classical example,
von Neumann and Morgenstern studied strategically equivalent n-person zero-sum
games [27, p. 245] and constant-sum games [27, p. 346].
In a recent work by Possieri and Hespanha, the authors consider the problem
of designing strategically equivalent games [22]. As such, given a bimatrix game
G, their problem is to design a family of games that is either weakly strategically
equivalent5 or strongly strategically equivalent6. Since this work falls into the
category of mechanism design, it is incompatible with the work that we present
here. Indeed, we consider the inverse problem- given a bimatrix game G, does there
exist a strategically equivalent game of strictly lower rank?
More closely related to our work is the class of strategically zero-sum games
defined by Moulin and Vial in [20]. They study the class of games in which no
completely mixed NE can be improved upon via a correlation strategy and come
to the conclusion that these games are the class of strategically zero-sum games.
For the bimatrix case, they provide a complete characterization of strategically
zero-sum games [20, Theorem 2].
Around the same time, Isaacson and Millham studied a class of bimatrix games
that they characterized as row-constant games [16]. They define row-constant games
as those bimatrix games where the sum of the payoff matrices is a matrix with
constant rows. In their work, they show that the NE strategies of a row-constant
game can be found via solving the zero-sum game (m,n, A,−A). Comparing [16]
and [20], one can easily see that row-constant games form a subclass of strategically
zero-sum games.
Closely related to strategically zero-sum bimatrix games are the class of strictly
competitive games [5]. In a strictly competitive game, if both players change their
mixed strategies, then either the payoffs remain unchanged, or one of the two
payoffs increases while the other payoff decreases. In other words, all possible
outcomes are Pareto optimal. It has long been claimed that strictly competitive
games share many common and desirable NE features with zero-sum games, such
as ordered interchangeability, NE payoff equivalence, and convexity of the NE
set[10]. Indeed, Aumann claims that strictly competitive games are equivalent to
zero-sum games [5]. However, many years later Adler et. al. conducted a literature
search and found that the claim of equivalence of strictly competitive games and
zero-sum games was made was often repeated, but without formal proof [1]. They
then proceeded to prove that this claim does indeed hold true. Comparing the
5 The authors of [22] define weak strategic equivalence as games the have the same NE in
pure strategies.
6 The authors of [22] define strong strategic equivalence as games the have the same NE in
both mixed and pure strategies.
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results of Adler et. al [1] to the characterization of strategically zero-sum games in
[20], one can observe that Moulin and Vial were correct in asserting that strictly
competitive games form a subclass of strategically zero-sum games.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions in bimatrix games and the definition
of strategic equivalence in bimatrix games.
We consider here a two player game, in which player 1 (the row player) has
m actions and player 2 (the column player) has n actions. Player 1’s set of pure
strategies is denoted by S1 = {1, . . . ,m} and player 2’s set of pure strategies is
S2 = {1, . . . , n}. If the players play pure strategies (i, j) ∈ S1 × S2, then player 1
receives a payoff of aij and player 2 receives bij .
We let A = [aij] ∈ R
m×n represent the payoff matrix of player 1 and B = [bij ] ∈
R
m×n represent the payoff matrix of player 2. As the two-player finite game can
be represented by two matrices, this game is commonly referred to as a bimatrix
game. The bimatrix game is then defined by the tuple (m,n,A,B). Define the
m× n matrix C as the sum of the two payoff matrices, C := A+B. We define the
rank of a game as rank(C)7 .
Players may also play mixed strategies, which correspond to a probability
distribution over the available set of pure strategies. Player 1 has mixed strategies
p and player 2 has mixed strategies q, where p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆n. Using the
notation introduced above, player 1 has expected payoff pTAq and player 2 has
expected payoff pTBq.
2.1 Strategic Equivalence in Bimatrix Games
A Nash Equilibrium is defined as a tuple of strategies (p∗,q∗) such that each
player’s strategy is an optimal response to the other player’s strategy. In other
words, neither player can benefit, in expectation, by unilaterally deviating from
the Nash Equilibrium. This is made precise in the following definition.
Definition 1 (Nash Equilibrium [21]) We refer to the pair of strategies (p∗,q∗)
as a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if and only if:
p∗TAq∗ ≥ pTAq∗ ∀ p ∈ ∆m,
p∗TBq∗ ≥ p∗TBq ∀ q ∈ ∆n.
It is a well known fact due to Nash [21] that every bimatrix game with finite
set of pure strategies has at least one NE in mixed strategies. However, one can
define games in which multiple NE exist in mixed strategies. Let Φ : Rm×n ×
R
m×n
⇒ ∆m ×∆n be the Nash equilibrium correspondence
8: Given the matrices
(A,B), Φ(A,B) ⊂ ∆m × ∆n denotes the set of all Nash equilibria of the game
7 Some authors define the rank of the game to be the maximum of the rank of the two
matrices A and B, but this is not the case here.
8 A correspondence is a set valued map [4, p. 555].
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(m,n, A,B). Note that due to the result in [21], Φ(A,B) is nonempty for every
(A,B) ∈ Rm×n × Rm×n.
We say that two games are strategically equivalent if both games have the
same set of players, the same set of strategies per player, and the same set of Nash
equilibria. The following definition formalizes this concept.
Definition 2 The 2-player finite games (m,n, A,B) and (m,n, A˜, B˜) are strategi-
cally equivalent iff Φ(A,B) = Φ(A˜, B˜).
We now have a well known Lemma on strategic equivalence in bimatrix games
that is typically stated without proof.9 As we were unable to find a proof in the
literature, we state the relatively simple proof here.
Lemma 1 Let A,B ∈ Rm×n be two matrices. Let A˜ = α1A + β11mu
T and B˜ =
α2B + β2v1
T
n where β1, β2 ∈ R, α1, α2 ∈ R>0, u ∈ R
n, and v ∈ Rm. Then the game
(m,n, A,B) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, A˜, B˜).
Proof Since p ∈ ∆m and q ∈ ∆m, we have p
T1m = 1 and 1
T
nq = 1. Then, ∀(p,q) ∈
(∆m ×∆n) we have:
pTA˜q = pT(α1A+ β11mu
T)q = α1p
TAq+ β1u
Tq,
pTB˜q = pT(α2B + β2v1
T
n)q = α2p
TBq+ β2p
Tv.
Now, assume that (p∗,q∗) is an NE of (m,n, A˜, B˜). Then, for player 1,
p∗TA˜q∗ = α1p
∗TAq∗ + β1u
Tq∗
≥ α1p
TAq∗ + β1u
Tq∗ = pTA˜q∗ ∀p ∈ ∆m
⇐⇒ p∗TAq∗ ≥ pTAq∗ ∀p ∈ ∆m.
Similarly, for player 2,
p∗TB˜q∗ = α2p
∗TBq∗ + β2p
∗Tv
≥ α2p
∗TBq+ β2p
∗Tv = p∗TB˜q ∀q ∈ ∆n
⇐⇒ p∗TBq∗ ≥ p∗TBq ∀q ∈ ∆n.
Then Definition 2 is satisfied, and (p∗,q∗) is an NE of (m,n,A,B) if and only if
(p∗,q∗) is an NE of (m,n, A˜, B˜). ⊓⊔
3 Problem Formulation and Main Result
The positive affine transformation (PAT) that we have presented in Lemma 1 has
been well studied for the forward direction case. In those situations, one calculates
the Nash equilibria of the game (m,n,A,B). Then, by choosing suitable parameters
(αi, βi,u,v), one can design a family of games (m,n, A˜, B˜) that share the same set
of NE as (m,n, A,B), but with a different payoff structure.
9 See e.g [20,18].
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Here, we consider the inverse problem. Given a game (m,n, A˜, B˜), is it possible
to determine parameters (αi, βi,u,v), such that (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equiv-
alent to (m,n, A,B) via a PAT? This is particularly interesting when the game
(m,n, A,B) is a low rank game and (m,n, A˜, B˜) is a game of higher rank. In other
words, rank(A+B) = k and rank(A˜+ B˜) = k˜, with k˜ > k.
Low rank games are an interesting class of games to study, as the rank of a
game is known to impact both the most suitable computation methods for deter-
mining a solution and the expressive power of the game. For example, it is well
known that zero-sum games, where k = 0, can be solved via a linear programming
approach. In addition, recent work has shown computationally efficient algorithms
for finding one NE [2] or all NE [2,23] of rank-1 games. For approximate NE, [17]
give a computational method for rank-k games, defined as a class of games where
rank(A+B) ≤ k, for some given k.
As for the expressive power of a game, we consider the maximum number of NE
that a game may have. For nondegenerate10 zero-sum games, it is well-known that
there is only one possible NE. As for the expressive power of rank-k games, with
k > 0, the maximal number of NE is an open question. However, lower bounds,
even for rank-1, are significantly higher than the zero-sum case; see, for example,
[17, Corollary 3.1] and [3].
With the motivation for determining the true rank (whether the game is strate-
gically equivalent to a game of lower rank) established above, we now turn our
attention to analyzing the mathematical properties of the positive affine transfor-
mation.
From Lemma 1, we conclude that if there exists β1, β2 ∈ R, α1, α2 ∈ R>0,
u ∈ Rn, and v ∈ Rm such that:
A˜ = α1A+ β11mu
T, (1)
B˜ = −α2A+ β2v1
T
n + α2
k∑
1
ric
T
i (2)
then (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to the rank-k game (m,n, A,−A +∑k
1 ric
T
i ) via a positive affine transformation (PAT).
Combining (1) and (2), we have:
A˜ = −
α1
α2
B˜ + α1
k∑
1
ric
T
i + β11mu
T +
α1
α2
β2v1
T
n. (3)
Defining γ := α1α2 , uˆ := β1u, vˆ := γβ2v, and letting α1ric
T
i = rˆicˆ
T
i , we rewrite
(3) as:
A˜+ γB˜ = 1muˆ
T + vˆ1Tn +
k∑
1
rˆicˆ
T
i . (4)
Thus, what we have shown above is the following result:
Proposition 1 If (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, A,−A+
∑k
1 ric
T
i )
through a PAT, then A˜+ γB˜ = 1muˆ
T + vˆ1Tn +
∑k
1 rˆicˆ
T
i .
10 For a concise discussion of (non)degeneracy, see [28, Section 2.6]
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Proof The proof follows from the preceding discussions. ⊓⊔
In what follows, we show the converse holds. Furthermore, in Section 4, we
show constructive methods for obtaining a game of lower rank that is strategically
equivalent to the original game.
Assumption 2 The game (m,n, A˜, B˜) satisfies
1. There exists a γ∗ ∈ R>0 such that rank(A˜+ γ
∗B˜) = k¯ < rank(A˜+ B˜)
2. There exists uˆ, rˆi 6= 0n and vˆ, cˆi 6= 0m such that A˜+ γ
∗B˜ can be decomposed into
A˜+ γB˜ = 1muˆ
T + vˆ1Tn +
∑kˆ
1 rˆicˆ
T
i .
Theorem 3 If Assumption 2 holds, then there exists a matrix Aˆ ∈ Rm×n and vectors
rˆi ∈ R
m, cˆi ∈ R
n such that the bimatrix game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent
to the rank-kˆ game (m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ+
∑kˆ
1 rˆicˆ
T
i ), where kˆ = k¯ − 2 < rank(A˜+ B˜)− 2.
Proof The result is an immediate consequence of Theorem 10, which we state and
prove in Section 4. ⊓⊔
In Section 4, we prove Theorem 10 and, consequently, Theorem 3 above,
through a series of intermediate theorems and corollaries. We will show the neces-
sary conditions under which Assumption 2 holds true and devise methods to test
those conditions. In addition, we will show that if either condition of Assumption 2
hold true, it is possible to reduce the rank of the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) to some degree,
although that reduction isn’t as high as the reduction that one obtains when both
conditions hold true.
We can therefore decompose our problem into two parts based on Assumption
2, and a third part based on constructing the strategically equivalent lower-rank
game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ). Those three parts are:
1. Given (m,n, A˜, B˜), determine whether or not there exists γ∗ ∈ R>0 such that
rank(A˜+ γ∗B˜) < rank(A˜+ B˜). If there does not exist any γ∗ satisfying this
condition, then set γ∗ = 1.
2. With γ∗ determined above, determine if there exists uˆ ∈ Rn and vˆ ∈ Rm such
that A˜+ γ∗B˜ can be decomposed into A˜+ γ∗B˜ = 1muˆ
T + vˆ1Tn +
∑kˆ
1 rˆicˆ
T
i .
3. From A˜+ γ∗B˜ determined above, construct the strategically equivalent rank-kˆ
game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ)
In the sequel, we will show that part 1 of the problem is closely connected to
the matrix pencil problem. We will then proceed to show that parts 2 and 3 can
be efficiently solved by applying the classical Wedderburn rank reduction formula.
4 Proof of The Main Result
In this section, we introduce matrix pencils, discuss an existing canonical form for
calculating the eigenvalues of rectangular pencils, and show how such a canonical
form can be applied to obtain a bimatrix game of lower rank than the original
game. Following that, we will discuss the Wedderburn rank reduction formula and
apply that to further reduce the rank of a game. Finally, we conclude the section
with the statement and proof of our main result.
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4.1 Matrix Pencils
Let A,B ∈ Rm×n be matrices of known values, and let λ represent an unknown
parameter.11 Then the set of all matrices of the form A+ λB, with λ ∈ C, define
a linear matrix pencil (or just a pencil)[11, p. 24],[15].12
While not as well studied as the standard eigenproblem, A− λI, the theory of
pencils still enjoys a rich history. For the square, nonsingular, m×m case, Weier-
strass investigated pencils and developed a canonical form as early as 1867. The
rectangular case was later solved, with a canonical form presented, by Kronecker
in 1890. His canonical form, aptly named the Kronecker Canonical Form (KCF),
was popularized by Gantmacher in chapter XII of his two volume treatise on the
theory of matrices [11, Ch. 12]. For a (not so short) survey on pencils, we refer
the reader to [15]. For a discussion of the various canonical forms and computa-
tional methods, for the square case see [12, Ch. 7.7], and for the more general
singular/rectangular case, see [8].
In a series of papers, [30,25], the authors study the relationship between the
eigenvalues and eigenvectors of matrix pencils and the solution of a zero-sum game,
where the game is formulated as (m,n, A−λB,−A+λB).13 Their results are indeed
theoretically interesting; however, as the author states in [30], the relationship
between eigensystems and game theory is ”tenuous”. This seems to make, at least
in accordance with the current theoretical results, the study of eigensystems ill-
suited as a solution concept for bimatrix games. In contrast, as we will show in this
subsection, the matrix pencil problem is well-suited to the study of strategically
equivalent games.
In the remainder of this section, we review the canonical form of a matrix pencil
presented by Thompson and Weil in [24,25]. Although not a common terminology
in the literature, we’ll refer to this canonical form as the Thompson-Weil Canonical
Form (TWCF). Our motivation for studying the TWCF is two-fold. First off, the
TWCF focuses on only computing those eigenvalues, if they exist, that strictly
reduce the rank of the pencil A + λB. Other extraneous values, such as those
computed in the KCF, are ignored. Secondly, we wish to bring renewed emphasis
on existing results that connect the study of matrix pencils to game theory.
For completeness, we now restate some results from [24,25,7]. Following that,
we show how to apply those results to calculate an equivalent game of lower rank.
Let rank(A)=p and rank(B)=r.
Definition 3 ([25, Definition 2.1]) By a solution to the pencil A+ λB, we shall
mean a triple (λ,x,y) ∈ C × Rn × Rm, satisfying x 6= 0 and y 6= 0, that solve the
11 In general, the theory of matrix pencils is defined over a field F. In a our game-theoretic
context, we restrict this field to the field of real numbers.
12 The literature defines both the set of matrices A + λB and A − λB as pencils. Although
A−λB seems to be more common (possibly due to the connection to the standard presentation
of the eigenvalue problem A−λI), we choose to use A+ λB as it more closely aligns with the
problem presented in Section 3.
13 The square, traditional eigenvalue problem with (m,m,A−λI,−A+λI) is studied in [30].
The authors present the rectangular matrix pencil version in [25].
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set of equations
(A+ λB)x = 0,
yT(A+ λB) = 0,
and have the property that rank((A+ λB)) < rank((A+ µB)) for any µ that is
not an element of the solution triple.
Throughout their series of works on matrix pencils, the authors of [24,25,7] refer
to the solution triple in Definition 3 by various names such as pencil value, pencil
roots, rank-reducing numbers, left pencil-vector, and right pencil-vector. For simplicity,
we choose to use the terms eigenvalue and left\right eigenvector. We will also use the
set λ(A,B) to represent all λ that are in the solution triple as defined in Definition
3.14
Lemma 2 ([24, Lemma 1]) For all A,B ∈ Rm×n, there exists nonsingular S1 and
T1 such that S1(A+ λB)T1 can be partitioned into:


r t q
r E11 E12 0 0
s E21 0 0 0
q 0 0 Iq 0
0 0 0 0

+ λ


Ir 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0

 (5)
where q ≤ min{m − r, n − r, p}, E12 is in column echelon form, rank(E12) = t, E21
is in row echelon form, and rank(E21) = s. Any of s, t, q may be zero, r+ s+ q ≤ m,
and r + t+ q ≤ n.
Proof See Lemma 1 of [24] or Theorem 2.1 of [25].
Lemma 3 ([24, Lemma 2]) If s + t > 0 in Lemma 2, there exists nonsingular S2
and T2 such that S2(A+ λB)T2 can be partitioned into:


r−s s t q
r−t C11 0 0 0 0
t 0 0 It 0 0
s 0 Is 0 0 0
q 0 0 0 Iq 0
0 0 0 0 0

+ λ


D11 D12 0 0 0
D21 D22 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

 (6)
Proof See Lemma 2 of [24].
Furthermore, by repeated applications of Lemmas 2 and 3, the authors define
an iterative algorithm that solves for the set λ(A,B), including identifying if
λ(A,B) = ∅. We briefly outline the algorithm in Algorithm 1. For the full proof
and implementation details, we refer the reader to [24,7].
14 Note to the reader who is more familiar with the KCF form. The set λ(A,B) exactly
corresponds to the eigenvalues of the Jordan block in KCF form.
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Remark 1 As the authors note in [7], their algorithm may be numerically unsound
for ill-conditioned problems. Indeed, while there does not appear to be any results
in the literature comparing the numerical stability of the TWCF algorithm and
Gantmacher’s method for computing the KCF, it seems likely that both methods
may share similar numerical difficulties. Therefore, other algorithms may be better
suited for ill-conditioned problems. For the square, dense matrix pencil, (whether
ill-conditioned or not) the famous QZ algorithm of Moler and Stewart is likely a
better option [19],[12, Ch. 7.7]. For the rectangular case, numerical accuracy for
ill-conditioned problems can likely be improved via the GUTPRI algorithm [8].
However, even in light of this discussion, we choose to explore the TWCF as it
provides insight into the mathematical structure of the pencil that applies to our
problem at hand.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing the eigenvalues of a pencil using the
Thompson-Weil Canonical Form
1: function TWCF(A,B)
2: i← 1
3: A1 ← A,B1 ← B
4: flag←True
5: while flag do
6: Calculate E11,i, Iri , ri, si, ti, qi via (5)
7: if ri = si ∨ ri = ti then
8: λ(A,B)← ∅
9: flag←False
10: else if si + ti = 0 then
11: λ(A,B)← λ(E11,i, Iri)
12: flag←False
13: else
14: Calculate C11,i,D11,i via (6)
15: Ai ← C11,i, Bi ← D11,i
16: end if
17: end while
18: return (λ(A,B))
19: end function
We now state one final definition before proceeding to state the main theorem
from [24], which we use to prove our first main result.
Definition 4 For any λ ∈ C, define the geometric multiplicity of λ as:
1. m(λ) = 0 if λ /∈ λ(A,B),
2. m(λ) = the number of Jordan blocks containing λ in the Jordan normal form
of E11,i where i is the smallest integer such that si + ti = 0.
Theorem 4 ([24, Theorem]) For any complex number λ,
rank(A+ λB) = r + q − m(λ)
where r and q are defined in Lemma 2 and m(λ) is as defined in Definition 4.
Proof See [24].
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As we are only concerned with the real, strictly positive eigenvalues, let us
further define the restricted set of eigenvalues as:
λ>0(A,B) = {λ ∈ R>0|λ ∈ λ(A,B)} = λ(A,B) ∩ (0,∞).
Theorem 5 Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) with rank(B˜) = r. Calculate λ>0(A˜, B˜)
and q as in Algorithm 1. If λ>0(A˜, B˜) 6= ∅, then select γ
∗ such that m(γ∗) = max{m(λ)}
for all λ ∈ λ>0(A˜, B˜). Let k˜ = rank(A˜+ B˜) and k¯ = rank(A˜+ γ
∗B˜). Define A¯ = A˜
and B¯ = γ∗B˜. If m(γ∗) > m(1), then the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent
via a positive transform to the rank-k¯ game (m,n, A¯, B¯), where k¯ < k˜.
Proof Clearly, if λ>0(A˜, B˜) = ∅, then for all λ ∈ R>0 we have rank(A+ λB) = r+q
by Theorem 4. As our goal is to identify games of strictly lower rank, let us
then suppose that λ>0(A˜, B˜) 6= ∅. Furthermore, suppose m(γ
∗) > m(1). Then, by
Theorem 4, we have that:
rank(A˜+ γ∗B˜) = r + q − m(γ∗) = k¯ < k˜ = r + q − m(1) = rank(A˜+ B˜).
Since, by definition, A˜ + γ∗B˜ = A¯ + B¯, we have that rank(A˜+ γ∗B˜) = k¯ =
rank(A¯+ B¯). Therefore, the game (m,n, A¯, B¯) is a rank-k¯ game. Finally, by Lemma
1, the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, A¯, B¯) with β1 = β2 = 0,
α1 = 1, α2 = γ
∗.
4.2 Further Reduction via the Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula
In this subsection, we show that if Theorem 5 identifies a reduction to an equivalent
game of lower rank, then it may be possible to reduce the rank even further. In
contrast, if Theorem 5 does not identify a game of lower rank, if certain conditions
hold we may still be able to reduce the rank of the game (by at most 2 in both
cases). In what follows, we first present the Wedderburn Rank Reduction formula
upon which our technique is based, and then we proceed to state and prove our
next two results.
The Wedderburn Rank Reduction formula is a classical technique in linear al-
gebra that allows one to reduce the rank of a matrix by subtracting a specifically
formulated rank-1 matrix. By repeated applications of the formula, one can ob-
tain a matrix decomposition as the sum of multiple rank-1 matrices. In contrast to
other well-known matrix factorization algorithms, such as singular value decompo-
sition, the Wedderburn rank reduction formula allows almost limitless flexibility in
choosing the basis of the rank-1 matrices that are subtracted at each iteration. For
further reading on the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, we refer the reader to
Wedderburn’s original book [29, p. 69], or to the excellent treatment of the topic
by Chu et al. [6].
We now proceed to state Wedderburn’s original theorem. Following that, we
show how one can exploit the flexibility of the decomposition to extract specifically
formulated rank-1 matrices that allow us, when certain conditions hold true, to
further reduce the rank of a bimatrix game.
Theorem 6 ([29, p. 69] [6]) Let C ∈ Rm×n be an arbitrary matrix, not identically
zero. Then, there exists vectors x1 ∈ R
n and y1 ∈ R
m such that w1 = y
T
1Cx1 6= 0.
Then, setting C = C1 for convenience, the matrix
C2 := C1 − w
−1
1 C1x1y
T
1C1 (7)
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has rank exactly one less than the rank of C.
Proof The original proof of (7) is due to Wedderburn [29, p. 69]. See Appendix A
for our restated version. ⊓⊔
Consider again the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) upon which one has applied Theorem 5.
Here we use the same notation as in Theorem 5. If Theorem 5 has identified a γ∗
such that k¯ < k˜, let (m,n, A¯, B¯) be as defined in Theorem 5. Otherwise, let A¯ = A˜
and B¯ = B˜. We now apply the following series of theorems and corollaries to this
game (m,n, A¯, B¯).
Theorem 7 Consider the game (m,n, A¯, B¯) with n ≥ m ≥ 2, C¯ = A¯ + B¯, and
rank(C¯) = k¯ ≥ 1. If
1m ∈ ColSpan(C¯) (8)
then there exists x1 ∈ R
n and y1 ∈ R
m such that C¯x1 = 1m and w1 = y
T
1 C¯x1 6= 0.
Let uˆT = w−11 y
T
1 C¯ and compute C¯2 using (7) as follows:
C¯2 = C¯ − w
−1
1 C¯x1y
T
1 C¯ = C¯ − 1muˆ
T.
Define Aˆ = A¯−1muˆ
T and Bˆ = B¯. Then the bimatrix game (m,n, A¯, B¯) is strategically
equivalent to the rank-(k¯ − 1) game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Before stating the proof of Theorem 7, we first state an auxiliary lemma that
we invoke in the proof.
Lemma 4 For any matrix M ∈ Rm×n with M 6= 0m×n there is at least one nonzero
column and one nonzero row. Let M(j) and M(i) denote such a column and row. Then,
with x = ej and y = ei we have that 1
T
nx 6= 0,1
T
my 6= 0, Mx = M
(j) 6= 0m, and
yTM =M(i) 6= 0
T
n.
Proof The proof is straightforward and therefore omitted. ⊓⊔
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7) Suppose (8) holds true, then there exists x1 ∈ R
n such
that C¯x1 = 1m. In addition, rank(C¯) ≥ 1 implies that C¯ 6= 0m×n. Then applying
Lemma 4 shows the existence of y1 such that w1 = y
T
1 C¯x1 6= 0. With w1 and uˆ
therefore well-defined, apply (7) to obtain C¯2 as in the statement of the theorem.
By Theorem 6, C¯2 is a matrix of rank-(k¯− 1). With Aˆ = A¯− 1muˆ
T and Bˆ = B¯ we
have that:
Aˆ+ Bˆ = A¯+ B¯ − 1muˆ
T,
= C¯ − 1muˆ
T,
= C¯2.
Then the game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, A¯, B¯) by Lemma 1
and has rank (k¯ − 1). ⊓⊔
Corollary 71 If in Theorem 7, (8) does not hold true but we have 1n ∈ ColSpan(C¯
T),
then the game (m,n, A¯, B¯) is strategically equivalent to a game of rank-(k¯ − 1).
Proof Apply the proof of Theorem 7 to C¯T, making the appropriate dimensional
changes to x1,y1, uˆ, and the all ones vector. Then let Aˆ = A¯ and Bˆ = B¯− uˆ1
T
n. ⊓⊔
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Corollary 72 Consider the game (m,n, A¯, B¯) with n ≥ m ≥ 2, C¯ = A¯ + B¯, and
rank(C¯) = k¯ = m. The game (m,n, A¯, B¯) is strategically equivalent to a game of
rank-(k¯ − 1)
Proof Clearly rank(C¯) = m implies that there exists x1 ∈ R
n such that C¯x1 = 1m.
Therefore, (8) holds true. The result then directly follows from Theorem 7. ⊓⊔
Theorem 8 Consider the game (m,n, A¯, B¯) with n ≥ m ≥ 2 and C¯ = A¯ + B¯. Let
rank(C¯) = k¯, where k¯ ≥ 2. If
1n ∈ ColSpan(C¯
T), (9)
∃x ∈
{
x ∈ Rn | C¯x = 1m,1
T
nx = 0
}
(10)
then there exists x1,x2 ∈ R
n and y1,y2 ∈ R
m such that:
1. w1 = y
T
1 C¯x1 6= 0. Let C¯x1 = 1m, uˆ
T = w−11 y
T
1 C¯, and compute C¯2 using (7) as
follows:
C¯2 = C¯ − w
−1
1 C¯x1y
T
1 C¯ = C¯ − 1muˆ
T.
2. y2C¯2 = 1
T
n and w2 = y
T
2 C¯2x2 6= 0. Let vˆ = w
−1
2 C¯2x2 and compute C¯3 using (7)
as follows:
C¯3 = C¯2 − w
−1
2 C¯2x2y
T
2 C¯2 = C¯ − vˆ1
T
n = C¯ − 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn.
Define Aˆ = A¯− 1muˆ
T and Bˆ = B¯ − vˆ1Tn. Then, Aˆ+ Bˆ = C¯3 =
∑k¯−2
1 rˆcˆ
T, where
rank(C¯3) = (k¯ − 2), and the bimatrix game (m,n, A¯, B¯) is strategically equivalent to
the rank-(k¯ − 2) game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Before stating the proof of Theorem 8, we first state proposition that is neces-
sary for the proof. Motivated by [6, Theorem 2.1], we have the following proposition
that gives conditions for when a chosen vector is in the row span of a matrix C2,
obtained after one application of (7).
Proposition 9 We use here the same notation as in Theorem 6. Let rank(C) = k,
with k ≥ 2. Let {x1,y1} be vectors associated with a rank-reducing process (so that
yT1Cx1 6= 0). We have z ∈ ColSpan(C
T
2 ) if and only if z ∈ ColSpan(C
T) and z ⊥ x1.
Proof See Appendix B. ⊓⊔
Proof (Proof of Theorem 8) By assumption (10), there exists a vector x such that
C¯x = 1m and 1
T
nx = 0. Let x1 equal such an x. Then, rank(C¯) ≥ 2 and Lemma 4
implies that there exists y1 ∈ R
m such that yT1 C¯ 6= 0n and 1
T
my1 6= 0. Therefore,
we have w1 = y
T
1 C¯x1 6= 0. Let w
−1
1 y
T
1 C¯ := uˆ
T, then w−11 C¯x1y
T
1 C¯ = 1muˆ
T. After
applying the Wedderburn rank reduction formula, we have
C¯2 = C¯ − w
−1
1 C¯x1y
T
1 C¯ = C¯ − 1muˆ
T.
We now proceed to show that there exists y2 such that y2C¯2 = 1
T
n. By as-
sumption (9), we have that 1n ∈ ColSpan(C¯
T). Also, by assumption 10, we have
that 1Tnx1 = 0. Then, by Proposition 9, 1n ∈ ColSpan(C¯
T) and 1Tnx1 = 0 implies
that 1n ∈ ColSpan(C¯
T
2 ). Therefore, there exists y2 such that y
T
2 C¯2 = 1
T
n.
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Let us now show the existence of x2 such that w2 6= 0. By Theorem 6 and
the assumption that rank(C¯) ≥ 2, we have that rank(C¯2) ≥ 1, which implies that
C¯2 6= 0m×n. Therefore, by Lemma 4 there exists x2 such that C¯2x2 6= 0m and
1Tnx2 6= 0. Then, w2 = y
T
2 C¯2x2 6= 0. Let vˆ = w
−1
2 C¯2x2, then w
−1
2 C¯2x2y
T
2 C¯2 = vˆ1
T
n.
Again, we apply the Wedderburn rank reduction formula to obtain
C¯3 = C¯2 − w
−1
2 C¯2x2y
T
2 C¯2 = C¯2 − vˆ1
T
n = C¯ − 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn.
The assumption that rank(C¯) = k¯ and Theorem 13 implies that rank(C¯3) =
k¯ − 2.
Finally, defining Aˆ := A¯− 1muˆ
T and Bˆ := B¯ − vˆ1Tn we have that
Aˆ+ Bˆ = B¯ + A¯− 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn,
= C¯ − 1muˆ
T − vˆ1Tn,
= C¯3.
Therefore, (m,n, A¯, B¯) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) by Lemma 1
and Aˆ+ Bˆ = C¯3, which is a rank-(k − 2) game. ⊓⊔
Remark 2 Conditions such as (10) in Theorem 8 can be easily verified, for example
by:
(10) holds⇐⇒ rank
([
C¯ 1m
1Tn 0
])
= rank(C¯).
Solving for x1 in Theorems 7 and 8 is simply the solution of a linear equation,
C¯x1 = 1m, which is efficiently computable via a variety of methods.
15 As for de-
termining y1 in Theorem 7, one can select y1 exactly as shown in Lemma 4. Alter-
natively, one could select any random y1 such that y1 /∈ null(C¯
T) and yT11m 6= 0.
A similar construction holds true for selecting x2 in Theorem 8.
Therefore, what we’ve shown in Remark 2, is that Theorems 7 and 8 are indeed
constructive, and allow us to efficiently compute the strategically equivalent lower
rank game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ).
Finally, we now state our main result by combining the results of Theorems 5,
7, and 8.
Theorem 10 Consider the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) with rank(A˜+ B˜) = k˜ ≥ 1 and apply
Theorem 5. If there exists a γ∗ such that rank(A˜+ γ∗B˜) < rank(A˜+ B˜), then let A¯ =
A˜ and B¯ = γ∗B˜. Otherwise, let A¯ = A˜ and B¯ = B˜. Assume that either the conditions
of Theorem 7/Corollary 71 or the conditions of Theorem 8 hold true, and calculate
the game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) via the appropriate theorem. Then, the game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) is
strategically equivalent to the game (m,n, A˜, B˜) with rank(Aˆ+ Bˆ) < rank(A˜+ B˜).
Proof Either (m,n, A¯, B¯) is strategically equivalent to (m,n, A˜, B˜) by Theorem 5,
or the two games are equal by the statement of Theorem 10. In addition, we have
rank(A¯+ B¯) = k¯ ≤ k˜. Now, suppose the conditions of Theorem 7/Corollary 71
or the conditions of Theorem 8 hold true and calculate (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ). By The-
orem 7/Corollary 71 or Theorem 8, we have that (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) is strategically
equivalent to (m,n, A¯, B¯). Since (m,n, A¯, B¯) is also strategically equivalent to
(m,n, A˜, B˜), this implies that (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) is strategically equivalent (m,n, A˜, B˜).
Finally, by Theorem 7/Corollary 71 or Theorem 8, rank(Aˆ+ Bˆ) < k¯. Therefore,
rank(Aˆ+ Bˆ) < k¯ ≤ k˜ = rank(A˜+ B˜). ⊓⊔
15 Calculating y2 in Theorem 8 is a similar problem.
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5 Some Results on Rank Reduction in Generic Games
In this section, we collect some natural consequences of Proposition 9 for reducing
the rank of generic games. Recall that a game is determined by the matrices
(A,B) ∈ R2×(m×n). Thus, one can view R2×(m×n) as the space of all games. If one
picks a generic game from this space, it is natural to ask whether or not the rank
of the game can be reduced and by how much.
It turns out that Proposition 9 allows us to conclude the following two results.
In the first result, we focus on generic games in which m = n. It should be noted
that the set of generic games in the space R2×(m×m) with full rank has full measure.
We conclude that for such games, we can reduce the rank only by 1. In the second
result, we consider the case where m < n.
Proposition 11 If m = n and rank(C) = m, then for almost every (random) game
(m,m,A,B), the rank of the game can only be reduced by 1.
Proof In order to prove the result, we show that the set of games whose rank
can be reduced by two has Lebesgue measure 0. Note that by Proposition 9, we
can reduce the rank of the game by 2 if there exists x1 satisfying 1
T
mx1 = 0 and
Cx1 = 1m. Since C is full rank, there exists a unique x1 satisfying Cx1 = 1m,
which is given by x1 = C
−11m. Thus, the rank of the game can be reduced by 2 if
and only if 1TmC
−11m = 0. This holds if the cofactors of the matrix C sum to zero.
The sum of cofactors is a multivariate polynomial of degree m − 1, and thus, the
set of points where this polynomial equals 0 is an (m− 1) dimensional manifold in
a m2 dimensional space. Consequently, the set of all C ∈ Rm×m whose cofactors
sum to zero has Lebesgue measure 0. ⊓⊔
In contrast to the case considered above, we restrict attention to games in
which 2 < m < n, rank of the sum C of payoff matrices is k ≤ m, and 1m ∈
ColSpan(C),1n ∈ ColSpan(C
T) is satisfied. This class of games forms a submanifold
in R2×(m×n) of dimension mn− (m− k)(n− k) − 2 = (m+ n− k)k − 2. We show
that for almost every game on this submanifold, the rank can be reduced by 2.
Proposition 12 For almost every (random) game (m,n,A,B) such that 3 < m < n,
rank(C) = k ≤ m, and 1m ∈ ColSpan(C),1n ∈ ColSpan(C
T), the rank of the game
can be reduced by 2.
Proof Let x1 be such that Cx1 = 1m. Split the matrix C and x1 as
C =
[
C11 C12
C21 C22
]
, x1 =
[
x11
x12
]
, (11)
where C11 is a k×k full rank submatrix, x11 is a k×1 vector, and x12 is a (n−k)×1
vector. Note that due to our assumption, n− k ≥ 1. We note here that if k = m,
then C21 and C22 may be empty matrices.
Now, due to Proposition ..., we can reduce the rank of the game by 2 if there
exists x1 satisfying 1
T
nx1 = 0 and Cx1 = 1m. Thus, Cx1 = 1m implies
C11x11 + C12x12 = 1k =⇒ x11 = C
−1
11
(
1k − C12x12
)
.
Similarly, 1Tnx1 = 0 implies
1Tkx11 + 1
T
n−kx12 = 0k.
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Substituting the value of x11 from above, we get
1TkC
−1
11
(
1k − C12x12
)
+ 1Tn−kx12 = 0k.
Rearranging the equation yields
1TkC
−1
11 1k =
(
1TkC
−1
11 C12 − 1
T
n−k
)
x12
The left side of the equation is non zero for almost every matrix C11. The right side
can be nonzero for an appropriate choice of x12 if and only if C
T
12C
−T
11 1k 6= 1n−k.
The set of C where CT12C
−T
11 1k = 1n−k is a manifold of dimension k in the space of
dimension mn− (m− k)(n− k)− 2 = (m+ n− k)k− 2; thus, this set has Lebesgue
measure 0. The proof of the statement is complete. ⊓⊔
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some immediate consequences of our results from Section
4, compare our results to a similar result in the literature, and briefly touch on
some algorithmic implications.
First-off, an immediate consequence of Corollary 72 that we show in [13] is that
all 2×n games are strategically equivalent to another game that is at most a rank-1
game. In that work, we give an algorithm for determining such an equivalent game
in polynomial time. Combined with the polynomial time rank-1 algorithm of [2],
this provides an alternative polynomial time algorithm to the well-known support
enumeration algorithm [9] for solving 2× n games.16
Secondly, in [23, Lemma 2.5], the author shows that all m×m games of rank-m
are strategically equivalent to a game of rank m−1. We briefly restate that lemma
here in order to compare and contrast our results.
Lemma 5 ([23, Lemma 2.5]) Let (m,m,A,B) be a game of rank-m. Then there
exists a game of rank-(m − 1) with the same set of Nash equilibria.
Our result in Corollary 72 generalizes Lemma 5 to game (m,n,A,B), with
m ≤ n and rank(A+B) = m. In addition, Theorems 7 and 8 further generalizes
the result to hold for certain games that are not full rank. Furthermore, while
the statement and proof of Lemma 5 shows the existence of such a lower-rank
equivalent game, our results are constructive and provide a method for calculating
the lower-rank equivalent game.
In order to focus this work on the mathematical theory of rank reduction
in bimatrix games, we’ve purposely avoided discussing algorithmic implications
throughout the previous sections. Here, we briefly note that our results readily lead
to efficiently implementable algorithms. For example, in our submitted work [14],
we show an alternative method for calculating γ∗ when (m,n, A˜, B˜) is strategically
equivalent to a zero-sum (rank-0) game. That method, along with some algorithmic
tweaks to Theorems 7 and 8, leads to an algorithm that can determine whether or
not a given game is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game via a PAT. If so, the
16 For 2× n games, the support enumeration algorithm [9] finds all solutions in time O(n2),
with worse case performance of finding one solution also being O(n2).
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algorithm also returns the strategically equivalent zero-sum game (m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ).
Furthermore, we show that determining γ∗ and (m,n, Aˆ,−Aˆ) can both be done in
linear time (O(mn)).
For rank-1 games, we’ve also developed an algorithm based on results similar
to Theorems 5, 7, and 8 that can determine whether a given game, (m,n, A˜, B˜), is
strategically equivalent to a rank-1 game and, if so, return the equivalent rank-1
game (m,n, Aˆ, Bˆ) in linear time (O(mn)). However, the modified versions of the
results and the ensuing algorithms require many carefully constructed technical
details. As such, we’ve chosen to report those results in another work in order to
avoid unnecessarily obscuring the more general results that we’ve reported on in
this work.
7 Conclusion
Non-zero sum games have been shown to be computationally challenging to solve.
In this paper, we present an alternative approach to computing equilibrium in a
certain class of non-zero-sum games. Given a non-zero-sum game, our approach
exploits the strategic equivalence between bimatrix games to construct a lower
rank bimatrix game that is strategically equivalent to the original game via a
positive affine transformation. Moreover, our technique is constructive, that is, we
can derive an algorithm to reduce the rank of the given game.
Our approach has the potential to reduce the rank of the game substantially
in some cases. If the original game can be reduced to a rank 0 (also known as
zero-sum game) or a rank 1 game, then we know that it can be solved efficiently
using algorithms involving linear programs or parametrized linear programs, re-
spectively.
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A Wedderburn Rank Reduction Formula and Some Consequences
In this section, we collect proofs and other results that were omitted from the main body.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6) The original proof of (7) is due to Wedderburn [29, p. 69]. We
restate it here for completeness.
We first show that the null space of C2 contains the null space of C1. Pick z such that
C1z = 0. Then,
C2z = C1z− w
−1
1 C1x1y
T
1C1z = 0.
Thus, z is in the null space of C2, which implies that the null space of C2 contains the null
space of C1.
Next, we show that x1 is in the null space of C2, thereby showing that the dimension of
the null space of C2 is one more than dimension of the null space of C1 (since C1x1 6= 0).
Consider
C2x1 = C1x1 − w
−1
1 C1x1y
T
1C1x1 = 0.
Thus, the rank of C2 is one less than the rank of C1. ⊓⊔
We now have the following theorem that applies the Wedderburn rank reduction formula to
compute a decomposition of the matrix. While not explicitly invoked in our presentation, we
discuss the theorem in Subsection 4.2 and do use a truncated version of the theorem in Theorem
8 that terminates after two iterations. Therefore, we include the theorem for completeness.
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Theorem 13 (Rank-Reducing Process [29, p. 69] [6]) Let C ∈ Rm×n. If rank(C) = r,
then there exists xk ∈ R
n, yk ∈ R
m, k = 1, . . . , r such that wk = y
T
k
Ckxk 6= 0 and the
following holds:
Ck+1 = Ck −w
−1
k
Ckxky
T
kCk k = (1, 2, . . . , r) (12)
where C1 = C, Cγ+1 = 0, and rank(Ck+1) = rank(Ck)−1. In addition, define rank 1 matrices
Wk := w
−1
k
Ckxky
T
k
Ck. Then, we have
C =
r∑
k=1
Wk. (13)
Proof Apply Theorem 6 to C for r + 1 iterations. ⊓⊔
B Proof of Proposition 9
Proof Suppose that z ∈ ColSpan(CT2 ). Then there exists a y2 ∈ R
m such that CT2 y2 = z.
Choose such a y2 and define v2 as
v2 := y2 −
yT2Cx1
yT1Cx1
y1. (14)
Directly from Theorem 6, we have
yT2C2 = y
T
2C −w
−1
1 y
T
2Cx1y
T
1C
yT2C2 =
(
yT2 −
yT2Cx1
yT1Cx1
yT1
)
C
yT2C2 = v
T
2C (15)
Then by (15), z = CTv2 which implies that z ∈ ColSpan(CT). From the proof of Theorem
6, it is clear that x1 ∈ null(C2). Then
yT2C2x1 = v
T
2Cx1 = 0. (16)
Finally, with zT = vT2C we have that z ⊥ x1 by (16).
Now, suppose that z ∈ ColSpan(CT) and z ⊥ x1. Since rank(C) ≥ 2, the ColSpan(CT) is
at least a two dimensional subspace, and thus there exists a y1 ∈ Rm such that CTy1 and z
are linearly independent. Choose such a y1. Choose such a y1. Then, yT1Cx1 6= 0 and v2, as
given in (14), is well-defined. Select y2 such that CTy2 = z. Then,
v2 = y2 −
zTx1
yT1Cx1
y1 = y2 −
0
yT1Cx1
y1 = y2. (17)
By (15) and (17) , we then have:
yT2C2 = v
T
2C = y
T
2C = z.
Therefore, z ∈ ColSpan(CT2 ). ⊓⊔
